Analysis and Lessons of the Pump Theft Incident

Recently, the Pump platform experienced a serious security incident, resulting in significant financial losses. This article will conduct an in-depth analysis of this event and discuss the lessons learned.

Attack Process

The attacker is likely not a senior hacker, but rather a former employee of Pump. They have access to the wallet permissions used to create shitcoin trading pairs on a certain DEX, which we refer to as the "target account". The shitcoins created on Pump are referred to as the "preparatory account" before all their Bonding Curve LP pools meet the listing standards.

The attacker used a flash loan to fill all the pools that did not meet the listing standards. Normally, at this point, the SOL in the "preparation account" would transfer to the "target account" because the standards were met. However, the attacker took the opportunity to withdraw the transferred SOL, causing these meme coins that were supposed to be listed to fail to launch as scheduled.

Victim Analysis

1. The flash loan platform is unaffected because the loan is repaid within the same block.
2. The Dogecoin token that has already been launched on the DEX may not be affected because the LP has been locked.
3. The main victims are users who purchased tokens in all the unfilled pools on the Pump platform before the attack occurred, and their SOL was transferred away.

Discussion on the Reasons for the Attack

1. There are serious permission management vulnerabilities on the platform.
2. It is speculated that the attacker may have been responsible for filling the token pool. Similar to how some social platforms used bots in the early stages to purchase Keys to create hype, Pump may have allowed the attacker to use project funds to fill their own issued token pools (such as $test, $alon, etc.) to generate attention.

Lessons Learned

1. For imitators, do not focus only on surface functionality. Simply copying the appearance of a product is not enough to attract users; it is also necessary to provide an initial impetus.

2. Strengthen permission management and improve security awareness. Reasonably allocate and limit employee permissions, regularly update keys, and establish multi-signature mechanisms are all necessary security measures.

3. Establish a sound internal control system. This includes personnel management, fund management, key management, and various other aspects to prevent internal personnel from abusing their authority.

4. Emphasize code audits and vulnerability bounty programs. Conduct regular security audits and encourage white-hat hackers to discover and report vulnerabilities.

5. Enhance user risk awareness. The platform should clearly communicate potential risks to users and encourage them to take safety measures, such as using hardware wallets.

6. Establish an emergency response mechanism. Develop detailed emergency plans to ensure a swift response in the event of a security incident, minimizing losses to the greatest extent possible.

This incident once again warns that Web3 projects, while rapidly developing, cannot ignore basic security principles. Only by finding a balance between innovation and security can the healthy development of the industry be truly promoted.